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A CIVIL DISCOVERY DILEMMA FOR THE
ARIZONA SUPREME COURT
Carl Tobias*

I. INTRODUCTION

The growing balkanization of federal civil procedure has received
considerable critical commentary. Numerous members of Congress and the
federal judiciary, lawyers and legal scholars have lamented the fate of the
national procedure code. The drafters of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure hoped to establish those rules as a model that the states could
adopt, thus fostering national and intrastate procedural uniformity. This
objective was not realized generally or by very many specific jurisdictions.
Observers of the increasingly fractured procedural regime in the federal
arena have voiced concerns about the mounting numbers of strictures, the
accelerating pace of procedural change and the growing inconsistency of
the requirements imposed. Illustrative are the major 1983 and 1993 federal
discovery amendments, which new discovery provisions further revised in
December 2000. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 concomitantly
encouraged all ninety-four federal districts to prescribe local procedures for
reducing expense and delay in civil litigation, and these measures conflicted
with the Federal Rules. The fragmentation described above is most clearly
manifested in the area of discovery, which is a critical feature of many
modem civil lawsuits.
The precise effects of this federal procedural activity on state civil
process over the last two decades are unclear. However, numerous
jurisdictions have declined to adopt either the substantial 1983 or 1993
federal rules amendments, a situation that the new set of federal
modifications promises to exacerbate. Rule revisors in a significant number
of state systems might have wisely chosen to await a period of quiescence
in federal procedural change before undertaking additional reform. In any
event, the federal developments described above may have adversely
affected state civil process, or at least made civil procedure in the United
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continuing support. Errors that remain are mine.
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States much more inconsistent than the 1938 drafters contemplated.
Although Congress, judges, attorneys and legal academicians have devoted
considerable attention to federal procedure, these observers have essentially
ignored the impacts of federal developments on state civil process. The
comparatively limited comment those effects have received is unfortunate,
because the individuals and entities with responsibility for state procedural
reform often have derived helpful guidance from activities at the federal
level.
In this increasingly byzantine world of civil procedure, there is one
bastion of uniformity: Arizona civil procedure. The Arizona Supreme
Court, which has authority for amending the Arizona Rules of Civil
Procedure, has steadfastly attempted to maintain consistency between
Arizona state civil procedure and the Federal Rules. The Justices' efforts
may even suggest that members of the court found it preferable to be
uniform rather than right. Indeed, Arizona has occasionally surpassed the
federal rule revisors by instituting changes which they had not adopted or
had merely proposed. Illustrative is the 1992 imposition of presumptive
temporal limitations on depositions, strictures that those responsible for
altering the Federal Rules have only recently decided to implement.
Another example is Arizona's provision for mandatory pre-discovery
disclosure promulgated approximately two years before the federal proviso
that required disclosure took effect.
In September 1999, the Judicial Conference of the United States, the
policymaking arm of the federal courts, approved a comprehensive package
of amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing
discovery. The United States Supreme Court promulgated the set of
discovery revisions during April 2000 and the amendments became
applicable in December 2000 because Congress did not reject or modify the
package in the subsequent seven months. This group of federal rules
amendments constitutes the fourth substantial change in the federal
discovery provisions over the last two decades.
Arizona now confronts a dilemma. The Arizona Supreme Court must
decide whether it should continue to honor the longstanding tradition of
preserving consistency between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. This difficulty is complicated
because Arizona has recently participated in considerable discovery reform,
which differs somewhat from the federal discovery regime. Moreover, the
Arizona bench and bar may believe that their discovery system is superior
to the existing federal scheme in that it better serves the needs of the
Arizona judiciary, lawyers, parties and citizens. Furthermore, the patience
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of Arizona judges, attorneys and litigants for discovery reform may well
have been exhausted. This article analyzes the convergence of federal and
Arizona civil discovery regimes and the implications of recent federal
discovery amendments.
Section II examines the origins and development of the civil discovery
systems of the federal and Arizona trial courts and the important issue of
procedural uniformity. It specifically scrutinizes the current situation in the
federal sphere and in Arizona with emphasis on the federal provisions that the
United States Supreme Court recently prescribed and the reform of Arizona
discovery throughout the 1990s. This section concludes that the new
federal amendments present a conundrum for Arizona.
Section III of the paper offers suggestions for resolving this dilemma.
The Arizona Supreme Court must essentially decide whether it is preferable
to be consistent or correct. The determination will require the Justices to
undertake a finely-calibrated analysis which involves a complex
constellation of relevant factors. The Arizona Supreme Court must
consider, for instance, the benefits and disadvantages of uniformity, the
efficacy of new federal revisions and recently-instituted modifications in the
Arizona discovery regime, and the tolerance of the Arizona bench and bar
for additional change in the discovery scheme.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL AND ARIZONA CIVIL
DISCOVERY REGIMES

The historical background of the federal and Arizona systems of civil
discovery requires comparatively limited examination here, as the origins
and development of those procedural schemes have been rather thoroughly
chronicled elsewhere. 1 Nonetheless, considerable exploration of the
respective discovery regimes is justified because it improves understanding
of modern discovery in the federal and Arizona trial courts and because of
the difficulty that the new federal amendments pose for Arizona.

1.
E.g., Symposium, Conference on Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 517 ( 1998);
Symposium, Mandating Disclosure and Limiting Discovery: The 1992 Amendments to
Arizona's Rules of Civil Procedure and Comparable Federal Proposals, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1
(1993).
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A. The Federal System

1.

The Original Federal Rules

The original Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules (Advisory
Committee), comprising nine prominent members of the legal profession
and five well-respected law professors, relied on several fundamental tenets
in crafting the initial Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which became
effective in 1938. 2 The drafters meant for the rules to elevate substance
over form and to implement simple, non-technical approaches to
procedure. 3 In fact, "[t]he concept of uniformity among federal district
courts, between federal and state courts, and among the states represents a
variation on the idea of simplicity."4
The Advisory Committee also intended to foster merits-based resolution
of civil disputes after litigants and lawyers had secured discovery of the
maximum possible information which was relevant to their cases. 5 The
drafters correspondingly meant the discovery scheme to be rather openended and to accord attorneys substantial control over the pretrial process
and discovery. 6 Moreover, the Advisory Committee envisioned that judges
would administer discovery in a flexible, liberal manner, thereby facilitating
the disclosure of all applicable material and promoting settlement or
disposition on the merits. 7

2.
E.g., Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 494, 502-15 (1986); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987)
[hereinafter Subrin, Equity]; Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 74 CORNELLL. REV. 270, 272-77 (1989).
3.
See CHARLES E. CLARK, PROCEDURE-THE HANDMAID OF JUSTICE (1965); accord
James William Moore, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 6 l.C.C. PRACT. J. 41, 42

(1938).
4.
Tobias, supra note 2, at 274; accord Stephen N. Subrin, The New Era in American
Civil Procedure, 67 AB.A. J. 1648, 1650 (1981) [hereinafter Subrin, New Era].
5.
See generally Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1986); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96
HARV. L. REV. 374, 397 (1982).
6.
Alexander Holtzhoff, Origin and Sources of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1057 (1955); Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical
Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 717-34 (1998)
[hereinafter Subrin, Fishing]; see also id. at 692-701 (analyzing the history of discovery in the
federal courts prior to 1938).
7.
See Marcus, supra note 5, at 438-39; Subrin, New Era, supra note 4, at 1648-50.
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The Federal Rules During the First Three Decades

This system appeared to work comparatively well for the quarter-century
which following the adoption of the original Federal Rules during 1938.
The procedure code functioned efficaciously, and federal district court
judges successfully applied the rules to federal civil lawsuits. 8 The United
States Supreme Court promulgated relatively few amendments, most of
which federal court observers fairly characterized as "clarifying" revisions. 9
A significant number of states premised their civil procedure rules on the
federal analogues, while additional jurisdictions modeled specific strictures
or provisions governing particular procedural areas, namely discovery, on
the Federal Rules. 10
The broad, flexible system of procedure instituted by the initial rules
essentially enabled plaintiffs and the litigants' counsel to employ general
notice pleading, to acquire comprehensive information through discovery
and to reach the merits of controversies. 11 There were, however, certain
difficulties with the regime which the 1938 Federal Rules implemented.
Liberal pleading and tactical exploitation of the procedures were
More
problematic, especially in protracted and complex cases. 12
specifically, some members of the federal bench and legal commentators
claimed that the open-ended character of discovery permitted very
expansive requests for material and that district judges evinced reluctance to
enforce various discovery requirements with the requisite rigor. 13
Despite these criticisms, the original Federal Rules "continued to enjoy
good, albeit less glowing, press and continued to function reasonably well,"
even as late as the 1960s. 1 The Supreme Court prescribed a comparatively
small number of changes, few of which were substantive and most of which
8.
See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 1938-1958: Two
Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435, 445 (1958); Resnik, supra note 2,
at 515-17; Subrin, Equity, supra note 2, at 910.
9.
See Charles E. Clark, 'ClarifYing' Amendments to the Federal Rules?, 14 OHIO ST.
L.J. 241 (1953); Carole E. Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on Federal
Jurisdiction, 28 STAN. L. REV. 397, 397 n.2 (1976).
10. See Clark, supra note 8, at 435; John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules
in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367,
368--69 ( 1986).
11. See Marcus, supra note 5, at 439; Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur
or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. l (1984).
12. See Resnik, supra note 2, at 516; Subrin, Fishing, supra note 6, at 734-39.
13. E.g., New Dyckman Theatre Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 16 F.R.D. 203,
206 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Maurice Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58
COLUM. L. REV. 480 (1958); see also Subrin, Fishing, supra note 6, at 734-39.
14. Tobias, supra note 2, at 285; accord Resnik, supra note 2, at 515-16.
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reflected the goals of the initial Advisory Committee. 15 Particularly
significant to this article is the important 1970 package of revisions in the
discovery strictures that effectively left intact the notion of lawyer control. 16
3.

The Federal Rules During the Second Three Decades

By the early 1970s, certain federal court observers-especially leaders of
the bench and bar, such as Chief Justice Warren BurRer-had begun raising
concerns about the so-called "litigation explosion." 1 Counsel and parties
allegedly pursued too many civil actions, while a large percentage of these
cases purportedly lacked merit. 18 Most important, some judges, practicing
lawyers and legal scholars asserted that discovery was too broad, expensive
and time-consuming. 19 Concern about attorney abuse of the discovery
process prompted the Supreme Court to amend the provisions governing
discovery in 1980. However, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., authored a
dissent from this decision because he thought that the changes only
"tinkered" with the existing discove?c; system, rather than instituted the kind
of thoroughgoing reform necessary. 0 Three years thereafter, the Supreme
Court adopted a comprehensive package of revisions, many involving
discovery. The Justices intended to enlarge the responsibilities of counsel
as officers of the court and to increase judicial case management,
particularly of the pretrial process and discovery. 21
For example,
15. See Goldberg, supra note 9, at 397 n.2; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
16. See Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 748-50
(1998) [hereinafter Marcus, Discovery]; Miller, supra note 11, at 14-15; see also supra notes 67 and accompanying text.
17. E.g., Nat'! Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976); Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975); THE POUND CONFERENCE:
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FuTURE (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979)
[hereinafter THE POUND CONFERENCE].
18. E.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979); Warren E. Burger, Agenda
for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, in THE POUND CONFERENCE, supra note 17,
at 23; Thomas B. Marvell, Caseload Growth-Past and Future Trends, 71 JUDICATURE 151
(1987).
19. E.g., Marcus, supra note 5, at 441-43; Miller, supra note 11, at 6-11; Maurice
Rosenberg & Warren R. King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough is Enough,
1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 579.
20. See Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997 (1980).
"Congress' acceptance of these tinkering changes will delay for years the adoption of genuinely
effective reforms." Id. at 1000; see also Marcus, Discovery, supra note 16, at 756-60
(analyzing the revisions). But see Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive
Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV. 683 (1998).
21. See Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461U.S.1097 (1983). See
generally Arthur R. Miller, The 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
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amendments in Federal Rules 16 and 26 narrowed the scope of discovery
somewhat and accorded district judges considerably greater control over the
pace and amount of discovery22 while admonishing that jud~es should make
discovery commensurate with the needs of individual cases. 3
One decade later, the Supreme Court promulgated another thorough
group of rule changes, several of which substantially modified discovery.
The most important alteration was the controversial revision in Federal Rule
26 that prescribed mandatory pre-discovery disclosure. 24 This provision
required parties to exchange specific information before commencing
formal discovery. 25 The 1993 amendments also imposed presumptive
limitations on the number of interrogatories. 26
The United States Supreme Court recently promulgated a new set of
discovery changes, many of which are appropriately denominated
"conforming" or "technical" revisions. 27 Most significant, this package of
amendments narrows the scope of discovery to which parties have
traditionally been entitled. 28 Litigants will no longer be able to secure
information that is "relevant to the subject matter" of the lawsuit, in the
absence of a court order, but they will be entitled only to material which is
"relevant to the claim."29 The new provisions would concomitantly narrow
Promoting Effective Case Management and Lawyer Responsibility (Federal Judicial Center
1984) (analyzing the 1983 amendments favorably).
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (1983) (amended 1993); FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (1983) (amended 2000).
For analysis of the changes to Rule 16, see Robert B. McKay, Rule 16 and Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 818 (1988); Subrin, Equity, supra note 2, at 978-79.
23. FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(l) (1983) (amended 2000). For analysis of proportionality, see
Marcus, Discovery, supra note 16, at 760-64; Subrin, Fishing, supra note 6, at 744-45.
24. FED. R. C1v. P. 26(a)(l) (1993) (amended 2000); see also Carl Tobias, Civil Justice
Reform Sunset, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 547, 576-81 (analyzing the controversial revision).
25. FED. R. C1v. P. 26(a)(l) (1993) (amended 2000). For analysis of disclosure, see Griffin
B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1
(1992); Ralph K. Winter, In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 263, 264-71
(l 992).
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 30 (a)(2)(A) (1993) (amended 2000); FED. R. CIV. P. 33 (a); see also
Marcus, Discovery, supra note 16, at 765-{)8 (analyzing the set of revisions); Elizabeth G.
Thornburg, Giving the "Haves" A Little More: Considering the 1998 Discovery Proposals, 52
SMU L. REv. 229, 233-36 (1999); Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial
Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1589, 1616-17 (1994) (analyzing presumptive
limitations).
27. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 192 F.R.D. 340, 388 (2000)
[hereinafter 2000 Amendments].
28. See id.; see also Carl Tobias, Discovery Reform Redux, 3 l CONN. L. REV. 1433, 143940 (1999) (analyzing the major changes proposed).
29. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(l) (1993) (amended 2000) with FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(l) (1993); see also supra 2000 Amendments, note 27, at 388; Thornburg, supra note 26,
at 238-39 (analyzing the revision).
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the scope of automatic disclosure, so that parties will have to divulge less
information before undertaking formal discovery. 30 . The disclosure stricture
would have nationwide applicability which means that all of the ninety-four
federal districts, including Arizona, cannot continue to apply disclosure
requirements which differ from the Federal Rule. 31 Moreover, the revisions
would limit depositions to "one day of seven hours," unless a longer period
is "authorized by the court or stipulated by the parties."32 Finally, the
package includes a number of conforming or technical modifications which
this article does not examine. 33
B. The Arizona System

1.

The Arizona Rules During the First Five Decades

Arizona has essentially modeled its civil procedure and discovery
regimes on the Federal Rules· of Civil Procedure for many years. The
Arizona Supreme Court apparently chose to follow the federal provisions
because doing so would make civil practice in the federal and state courts of
Arizona uniform and simple, which were central objectives of the attorneys
and legal academicians who drafted the 1938 Federal Rules. 34 For example,
when the United States Supreme Court promulgated the significant federal
discovery revisions during 1970, 35 the Arizona Supreme Court
simultaneously prescribed major amendments in the Arizona rules
governing discovery that effectively conformed to the federal changes. 36
Indeed, the Arizona State Bar Committee Notes, which accompanied the
30. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(l)(A), (B) (1993) (amended 2000) with 2000
Amendments, supra note 27, at 382. See also Tobias, supra note 28.
31. The 1993 revision permitted districts to reject or modify the federal requirements, but
the Arizona District did neither. Compare FED. R. C1v. P. 26(a) (1993) (amended 2000) with
2000 Amendments, supra note 27, at 384; see also Thornburg, supra note 26, at 235-36
(discussing the opt-out provision in the 1993 rules); Tobias, supra note 26, at 1612-15 (same).
32. See 2000 Amendments, supra note 27, at 393 (amending Rule 30(d)(2)); see also
supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing earlier presumptive limitations).
33. See 2000 Amendments, supra note 27, at 382 et seq.; see also Thornburg, supra note
26 (affording additional analysis of the revisions).
34. Carol Campbell Cure, Practical Issues Concerning Arizona's New Rules of Civil
Procedure: A Defense Perspective, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 55, 56 n.6 (1993); see also supra notes 3-4
and accompanying text.
35. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
36. Compare the 1970 version of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 26, 29-30,
33-37, with the 1970 version of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 26, 29-30, 33-37.
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Arizona Justices' modifications, trenchantly stated that the "1970 revision
of rules is the first substantial alteration of discovery practice since the rules
were first adopted in 1939."37
When the United States Supreme Court implemented the important
package of federal amendments during 1983, 38 the Arizona Supreme Court
concomitantly instituted significant revisions that narrowed the scope of
discovery, accorded trial judges greater control over discovery's timing and
amount, and mandated that judges tailor discovery to the requirements of
specific cases. 39 The purposes and phraseology employed by the Arizona
Justices show that the Arizona Supreme Court essentially modeled the 1984
changes in Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure 16 and 26 on the 1983 federal
rules amendments. 40 In fact, the State Bar Committee Notes attending the
1984 revision in Rule l 6(b) expressly observed that the modification was
"intended to retain as much conformity with the federal rule as is consistent
with the needs of the state court system."41 The State Bar Committee
Notes, which accompanied the 1984 alteration in Rule 26, concomitantly
stated that the change was "aimed at preventing both excess discovery and
evasion of reasonable discovery devices" and was "intended to deal directly
with the problem of duplicative and needless discovery." 42 The Committee
Notes correspondingly remarked that the modification "should encourage
judges to identify instances of unnecessary discovery and to limit the use of
the various discovery devices accordingly," while the "new provision
contemplates earlier and greater judicial involvement in the discovery
process" in recognition that "discovery cannot always be self-regulating."43
2.

The Arizona Rules During the Last Decade

The Arizona and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure remained similar, if
not identical, until the 1990s. At this time, judges, lawyers, litigants and
members of the public in Arizona seemingly perceived the existence of
phenomena-phenomena which were analogous to those developments that
37. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 26 State Bar Comm. Notes (1970) (amended 2000); see also infra
note 44 (suggesting that Arizona experienced "congestion and delay" in the 1950s and 1970s).
38. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
39. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 26 (1984) (amended 2000); see also supra notes 22-23 and
accompanying text (analyzing comparable federal rules revisions).
40. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (1983) (amended 1993) and FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a), (b)
(1983) (amended 2000), with ARIZ. R. C1v. P. 16, 26(a), (b) (1984) (amended 2000).
41. ARIZ. R. C1v. P. 16 State Bar Comm. Notes (1984) (amended 2000).
42. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 26 (a), (b) State Bar Comm. Notes (1984) (amended 2000).
43. Id.; see also supra notes 6, 16 and accompanying text (analyzing self-regulation).
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had prompted the United States Supreme Court to promulgate the 1983 and
1993 federal rules amendments. 44 The state, and perhaps more importantly
Maricopa County, were experiencing a "litigation explosion" and changes
in the civil litigation process. The Arizona Supreme Court and state district
judges responded with alterations of the provisions that were applicable to
the pretrial process, particularly discovery. This culminated with action by
the Arizona Supreme Court and the Arizona State Bar.
In March of 1990, the Supreme Court and the State Bar "appointed the
Special Bar Committee to Study Civil Litigation Abuse, Cost and Delay,
which was specifically charged with the task of studying problems
pertaining to abuse and delay in civil litigation and the cost of civil
litigation."45 After this entity undertook an extensive assessment, the
Committee members determined that the American civil litigation system
was imposing undue expense, requiring excessive time to complete cases
and threatening to limit court access for average citizens. 46 The entity
concomitantly concluded that certain adjustments in the dispute resolution
process and the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure were necessary to
conserve financial and temporal resources and decrease abuse "while
preserving the tradition of jury trial" as a means of deciding civil lawsuits. 47
Justice Thomas A. Zlaket of the Arizona Supreme Court elaborated and
specified the concerns which the Committee and additional observers had
articulated. 48 The Committee and the observers ascertained that the
changing legal culture in the country, and seemingly in Arizona, fostered
"'scorched earth' litigation tactics designed to wage economic 'paper wars'
of attrition on opponents, a new generation of 'litigators' who do not try
cases" and pre-trial discovery as an end in itself. 49 Moreover, Justice Zlaket
asserted, "huge numbers of interrogatories, marathon depositions, multiple
44. Supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. For analysis of"delay and congestion" in
the 1950s and 1970s, see Heinz Hink, Judicial Reform in Arizona, 6 ARIZ. L. REV. 13, 14-15
(1964); Richard B. Cuatto, Note, A Statistical Analysis of the Civil Caseload in Arizona, 1973
LAW & SOC. ORDER 143, 162 (1973).
45. ARIZ. R. C1v. P. 26.l Court Comment to 1991 Amendment; see also Tobias, supra
note 26, at 1601 (analyzing the work of a similar entity at the federal level).
46. ARIZ. R. C1v. P. 26.l Court Comment to 1991 Amendment; see also Michael A.
Yarnell, A Judicial View: Living With the New Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35,
35-38 (1993); Thomas A. Zlaket, Encouraging Litigators to Be Lawyers: Arizona's New Civil
Rules, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1993).
47. ARIZ. R. C1v. P. 26.1 Court Comment to 1991 Amendment.
48. Zlaket, supra note 46, at 3-4; see also Symposium Conference on Discovery Rules,
supra note 1 (several of the symposium papers also allude to these concerns).
49. See Zlaket, supra note 46, at 3; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text
(expressing similar ideas).
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experts, voluminous document requests and other similar tactics have
become today's norm." 50 The jurist correspondingly contended that the
abuses detected by a number of the observers "have badly distorted the
proper role of the advocate in our system," while discerning an "increase in
abusive, obstructive and contentious behavior by members of the bar." 51
During September, 1990, the Committee proposed a thorough package of
rule amendments, principally governing discovery. 52 The Committee
intended the amendments to reduce inefficiency, cost and delay in the
Arizona state courts as well as increase the public accessibility of the
judicial system. 53 The Committee meant to establish a framework that
would facilitate the discovery of sufficient information "to avoid litigation
by ambush" and foster professionalism among attorneys while proclaiming
that its ultimate objectives were enhancing voluntary cooperation and
increasing information exchange. 54 The Committee concomitantly intended
to eliminate "hostile, unprofessional and unnecessarily adversarial"
behavior by practitioners. 55 The entity also admonished trial court judges to
"deal in a strong and forthright fashion with discovery abuse and discovery
abusers. " 56
The Arizona Supreme Court subjected the proposals that the Committee
had proffered to experimentation in 8000 cases that counsel and litigants
pursued in Maricopa County during 1990 and 1991, while the Justices
afforded members of the public extensive opportunities for comment on the
Committee's recommendations. 57 Justice Zlaket stated that the "new rules
should not have come as any surprise [because for] several years, similar
changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been under
consideration." 58

50. See Zlaket, supra note 46, at 3.
51. Zlaket, supra note 46, at 3-4; see also supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text
(expressing similar ideas).
52. See Zlaket, supra note 46, at 2-3.
53. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 26.l Court Comment to 1991 Amendment; see also infra note 59 and
accompanying text (stating that the Arizona Supreme Court adopted the package proposed).
54. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.l Court Comment to 1991 Amendment.
55. Id.
56. Id.; see also supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text (suggesting that similar ideas
animated the 1983 and 1993 federal rules amendments).
57. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.l Court Comment to 1991 Amendment; Zlaket, supra note 46, at
8; see also Robert D. Myers, MAD Track: An Experiment in Terror, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 11, 11
(1993) (analyzing the experimentation).
58. Zlaket, supra note 46, at 8; see also supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text
(analyzing the similar changes to the federal rules).
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In December, 1991, the Arizona Supreme Court promulgated the

comprehensive package of amendments, which the Committee had
proposed during September, 1990, and on July 1, 1992, those revisions
became effective. 59 The most controversial aspect of the alterations was the
provision for compulsory pre-discovery disclosure in Arizona Rule of Civil
Procedure 26.1. 60 This modification required litigants to divulge thoroughly
and simultaneously all relevant material that was known by or available to
the parties or their counsel at the beginning of cases and before the initiation
of formal discovery. 61 Additional amendments imposed presumptive
limitations on discovery-namely oral depositions, written interrogatories
as well as requests for production and requests for admission-which could
be changed by litigant stipulation or court order. 62 The revisions also
enhanced judicial management of the pretrial process as a general matter
and courts' control over discovery specifically. For instance, the provisions
increased the authority of judges to monitor the pace and scope of discovery
through pretrial conferences while mandating that trial courts impose
sanctions on parties or practitioners who abuse the litigation system. 63
In 1997, the Arizona Supreme Court implemented another reform in the
civil discovery scheme. 64 The Justices altered Rule 37 to provide guidance
for judicial treatment of information which parties and lawyers reveal late in
59. Amendments to: Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, reprinted in 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 291
app. (1993); see also ARIZ. R. C1v. P. 26 State Bar Comm. Notes (1984) (amended 2000)
(stating that Superior Court Uniform Rules of Practice were transferred to the Arizona Rules of
Civil Procedure or the Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court).
60. ARIZ. R. C1v. P. 26.l (amended 1991). For criticism of disclosure, see Colin
Campbell & John Rea, Civil Litigation and the Ethics of Mandatory Disclosure: Moving
Toward Brady v. Maryland, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 237, 244--47 (1993); Robert J. Bruno, The
Disclosure Rule is a Mistake, MARICOPA LAW. l (1992).
61. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 26.l (amended 1991). For analysis of disclosure, see Cure, supra
note 34, at 57-91; Francis J. Burke, Jr. & Karen A. Potts, Arizona's New Zlaket Rules and the
Private Practitioner: Death of Rambo?, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 99, 101-14 (1993); Jolene Mills,
Practical Implications of the Zlaket Rules from a Plaintifj's Lawyer's Perspective, 25 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 149, 156-65 (1993); supra note 25 and accompanying text (analyzing the federal disclosure
rule).
62. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 30(a), 33.1, 34(b), 36(b) (amended 1991). For analysis of the Arizona
presumptive limitations, see Cure, supra note 34, at 91-95; Yarnell, supra note 46, at 49-50;
see also supra note 26 and accompanying text (analyzing the federal presumptive limitations).
63. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 16, 26 (amended 1991); see also Zlaket, supra note 46, at 8
(analyzing the Arizona provisions); Myers, supra note 57, at 17, 20--28 (analyzing provisions'
application); Yarnell, supra note 46, at 38-43 (analyzing both); supra notes 21-23 and
accompanying text (analyzing analogous federal provisions).
64. I rely in this paragraph on ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(l) (amended 1997). Interviews with
Patience T. Huntwork, Chief Staff Attorney, Ariz. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 8, 1999 & Sept. 12, 2000) (on
file with author).
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the process, especially material that litigants or attorneys divulge
immediately before the commencement of trial. The Supreme Court
apparently intended this measure to be the last fine-tuning of the reforms
which the Justices had instituted in the 1990s.
3.

Summary By Way of Transition

The Arizona Supreme Court maintained a discovery system closely
modeled on the federal approach and essentially premised the Arizona
Rules of Civil Procedure governing discovery on the federal analogues for a
half-century. The Arizona Supreme Court only departed from this practice
in meaningful ways during the 1990s when the Justices decided to institute
significant reform of civil discovery. The decision of the United States
Supreme Court to prescribe the 1993 federal discovery revisions may
partially explain the determination of the Arizona Supreme Court to
promulgate the discovery amendments in 1992. Nevertheless, the Arizona
provisions differed somewhat from the federal changes apparently because
of dissatisfaction with the federal modifications and because the Arizona
Supreme Court seemingly wished to tailor the reform of discovery and the
pretrial process more precisely to the perceived problems with discovery
and the litigation system in the Arizona state courts. 65 Therefore, the new
federal discovery revisions, which the United States Supreme Court
recently promulgated and members of Congress did not modify, present a
dilemma for the Arizona Supreme Court.
III.

THE DILEMMA

AND ITS RESOLUTION

The Arizona Justices must in essence choose whether it is better to be
uniform or right. Now that the new federal alterations have become
effective, if the Arizona Supreme Court decides not to include these
provisos in the Arizona discovery rules, Arizona civil discovery will
diverge even more substantially from the federal scheme.
This
development would increase disuniformity and complexity in the federal
and state discovery regimes and perhaps enlarge the cost and time necessary
to complete discovery.
When the Arizona Justices make the determination, the jurists should
undertake a carefully-refined assessment of numerous, applicable
considerations. Perhaps the most important question for the Arizona
65.

ARIZ. R. C1v. P. 26.1 Court Comment to 1991 Amendment.
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Supreme Court is whether consistency between the Federal and Arizona Rules
of Civil Procedure is outweighed by additional factors, such as the need to
calibrate discovery strictures with any circumstances particular to the
Arizona state courts. The Arizona Supreme Court will probably be unable
to resolve this issue conclusively, until considerable empirical data has been
collected, analyzed and synthesized.
One significant factor for the court to consider will be the benefits and
detriments of reinstituting uniformity between the federal and Arizona
discovery systems. 66 The principal advantage of recapturing consistency
would be the enhanced ability of lawyers and litigants to find, understand
and satisfy one set of discovery measures that regulate practice in the
federal and state courts of Arizona. Insofar as the federal and state schemes
are identical or similar, these phenomena facilitate procedural compliance,
make discovery simpler, and limit the expense and time which are needed to
conclude discovery and complete cases. A return to uniformity should also
enable the Arizona bench and bar to realize the benefits of relatively settled
judicial construction of analogous provisions covering discovery and of the
well-considered thinking of national experts in the area of procedure.
However, it is important to recognize that the growing proliferation of
local requirements, which implicate discovery at the federal and state levels,
may simply frustrate efforts to reattain complete uniformity. For example,
the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the District of
Arizona include discovery measures that seemingly conflict with or
duplicate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 67 The Local Rules of
Practice for the Superior Courts in Arizona68 correspondingly incorporate
provisions which govern discovery that apparently contravene or repeat
those strictures which pertain to discovery in the Arizona Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The major disadvantage of making the Arizona discovery system
consistent with the federal approach would be the loss of flexibility to treat
special conditions that prevail in the Arizona state courts, which may differ
66. Cure, supra note 34, at 56 n.6; Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization
of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393, 1422-25 (1992).
67. See, e.g., D. ARIZ. R. 2.5, 2.7(c), App. A. (West 2001). See generally Tobias, supra
note 66; Carl Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure for the Twenty-First Century, 77 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 533 (Feb. 2002).
68. See, e.g., Local Rules of Practice for the Superior Court of Coconino County, Rule 14
(2001); Local Rules of Practice for the Superior Court of Yuma County, Rule 9 (2001). See
generally Hink, supra note 44, at 22; Oakley & Coon, supra note 10. Certain Uniform Rules of
Practice of the Superior Court of Arizona similarly contravened or repeated the strictures;
however, the Court recently repealed or transferred the Uniform Rules. See supra note 59.
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from circumstances in the ninety-four federal district courts and even the
current situation in the· Arizona federal district. Related concerns might be
the abandonment of discovery reforms familiar to the Arizona bench and
bar and the concomitant need to learn of, comprehend and apply different
procedural requirements. Insofar as Arizona has applied measures that the
federal courts and other states have not employed, the reestablishment of
uniformity could also eliminate Arizona's valuable contribution as a
laboratory for experimentation with promising mechanisms.
Another important consideration will be the relative efficacy of the new
federal discovery requirements and the discovery reforms implemented by
the Arizona state courts during the 1990s. The federal strictures essentially
narrow the information which attorneys and litigants have been able to
secure through discovery and automatic disclosure. 69 The changes,
therefore, generally favor defendants more than plaintiffs, who have the
burden of proving their cases, and many of whom need rather broad
discovery to make this proof. 70 Of course, it is impossible to ascertain
precisely what impacts the federal proposals will have, until federal district
judges have actually applied the new provisions and those procedures have
received careful evaluation. Nonetheless, historical experience with
discovery, particularly the 1983 and 1993 amendments which were intended
to contain discovery,7 1 suggests that the modifications will have the
consequences mentioned immediately above. The comparative effectiveness
of the presumptive limitations on the number of interrogatories and
depositions, which the United States Supreme Court imposed in 1993 and
which the Arizona Supreme Court prescribed during 1991, may
correspondingly inform understanding of how the temporal restrictions on
depositions mandated by the new federal revisions will operate. 72
The Arizona Supreme Court should attempt to determine exactly how
well its discovery reforms instituted during the 1990s have worked. For
instance, it would be helpful to know whether the Arizona automatic
disclosure requirements have promoted the early revelation of information
which has facilitated the resolution of civil lawsuits, especially by fostering
settlement, or whether the strictures have led to contentious disagreements
69. See Marcus, Discovery, supra note 16, at 775-76; Subrin, Fishing, supra note 6, at
744--45.
70. See Thornburg, supra note 26, at 229-31; Tobias, supra note 66, at 1441-42; see also
Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485, 495-98 (1988-89)
(analyzing plaintiff's proof in civil rights cases).
71. See Marcus, Discovery, supra note 16, at 760-68.
72. See supra notes 26, 32, 62, infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. The 1991
revision of Arizona Rule 30(a) imposed presumptive limitations on depositions' length.
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and unnecessary, costly and time-consuming satellite litigation over
precisely what must be divulged. The Arizona Supreme Court might
correspondingly institute efforts to ascertain whether presumptive discovery
limitations on depositions and interrogatives have saved expense or tim·e, an
inquiry that experience with the federal analogues could inform, 73 arid
whether according judges increased control over the pretrial process and
discovery has improved civil dispute resolution.
The Justices should carefully assemble, analyze and synthesize. the
maximum, feasible empirical data respecting these questions. Minimal
empirical data currently exist because the Arizona Supreme Court has
undertaken no formal attempt to study the impacts of the recent reforms
generally, while baselines for comparing the effects of discovery devices'
application have yet to be established specifically. 74 Several of the
applicable· issues may concomitantly resist precise empirical verification,
and a few questions apparently defy definitive resolution.
Nevertheless, some relevant information might be available and certain
raw data could be analyzed and synthesized. Moreover, the Arizona
Supreme Court may be able to survey judges, lawyers and litigants in the
state regarding their perceptions or to gather anecdotal information. The
Justices should also seriously consider commissioning an assessment by an
expert, independent evaluator, such as the National Center for State Courts
or the State Justice Institute, each of which has previously analyzed
procedures that the Arizona trial courts implemented. 75 Another helpful
possibility could be the Institute for Civil Justice of the RAND Corporation.
This research entity recently completed a comprehensive examination of
expense and delay reduction techniques, including a broad spectrum of
discovery and disclosure mechanisms that resemble the Arizona state court
reforms of the 1990s, with which the ninety-four federal districts
experimented between 1990 and 1997. 76
A related, instructive source that the Justices may consult is federal
district court data. District court experience with the implementation, and
evaluators' assessment, of the 1993 federal rules revisions would be
particularly helpful, especially the amendments imposing automatic
See supra note 72, infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
Huntwork interviews, supra note 64.
See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 10701 (1994) (authorizing the State Justice Institute).
See, e.g., JAMES s. KAKALIK ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
ACT IN PILOT AND COMPARJSON DISTRJCTS (1996); JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., JUST, SPEEDY AND
INEXPENSIVE?: AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM ACT ( 1996); see also Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and
Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 525 (1998).
73.
74.
75.
76.
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disclosure and presumptive limitations on interrogatories and depositions. 77
The federal changes differed somewhat from the 1992 Arizona alterations; 78
however, the respective provisions governing disclosure and presumptive
limitations are sufficiently similar so that material related to the efficacy of
the federal revisfons can increase understanding of the Arizona
amendments. Of course, the recent decision of the United States Supreme
Court to narrow the scope of automatic disclosure apparently suggests that
the federal rule revisors had some concerns about the procedure's operation,
even as the determination to impose presumptive limitations on the length
of depositions seemingly indicates a measure of satisfaction with this
.
79
teehmque.
An additional, significant factor will be the tolerance of the judiciary and
practicing attorneys in Arizona for greater discovery reform. Too much or
too frequent modification can exceed the patience of judges and lawyers
who must find, master and employ the new requirements. At some
juncture, the bench and bar will tire of, or find overly expensive, the effort
to discover, understand and apply incessantly changing strictures. Judges
and counsel in Arizona could well have reached that point. If so, it might
be advisable to impose a moratorium on discovery reform. 8 For example,
the Arizona Supreme Court could study the efficacy of the discovery
revisions instituted during the 1990s, while the Justices might await analysis
of the effectiveness of the federal amendments that district judges have been
applying since late 2000.
Any effort to provide recommendations for resolving the dilemma
presented by new federal discovery proposals would be presumptuous and
fraught with difficulty. Numerous ideas examined above suggest that the
Justices can best make this decision by consulting the maximum, relevant,
empirical data which expert, independent evaluators have systematically
collected, assessed and synthesized. However, that information has yet to
be assembled. Notwithstanding these substantial complications, a few
recommendations can be offered.

°

77. See, e.g., James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the
Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613 (1998); Willging, supra note 76;
see also supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (analyzing disclosure and presumptive
limitations).
78. See supra notes 24-26, 59-63 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 24, 26, 32, 72 and accompanying text.
80. See Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Reform: A Call for a Moratorium,
59 BROOK L. REV. 841, 856 (1993); Carl Tobias, More Modern Civil Process, 56 U. PITT. L.
REV. 801, 839 (1995).
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For several reasons, the best approach during the immediate future
would apparently be to defer consideration of the 2000 federal amendments.
These reasons are the federal rule revisors' seeming penchant for
increasingly frequent, and often contradictory, alteration of the discovery
requirements; 81 the apparent efficacy of the Arizona discovery reforms
instituted during the 1990s; the peculiar circumstances that presently exist
in the Arizona state courts; and the need for careful analysis of the new
federal amendments and the recent Arizona reforms. Once the federal
modifications have received application and close evaluation in all ninetyfour federal district courts and the Arizona Justices have scrutinized their
reforms of the 1990s, the Arizona Supreme Court should be able to make
several important judgments with greater certainty than is possible today.
The Justices can probably determine more conclusively whether the new
federal changes deserve adoption and whether a return to uniformity is
required. The Arizona Supreme Court could also ascertain whether the
Arizona reforms have been successful enough to warrant retention, or if
Arizona's situation is sufficiently unusual and troubling to necessitate
continued application, and, thus, the perpetuation of inconsistency between
the federal and state discovery regimes. In short, the Arizona Justices will
need better information than is currently available to make the finest
decision with the requisite confidence.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Arizona Supreme Court maintained much consistency between the
discovery systems in the Arizona and the federal trial courts until the 1990s.
The new federal discovery amendments, which became applicable in late
2000, pose a dilemma for the Justices. If the Arizona Supreme Court rejects
those revisions, the Justices will allow Arizona discovery to depart further
from the federal scheme and the court may well jeopardize the possibility of
reinstituting uniformity. Should members of the court adopt the federal
modifications, the Justices might threaten certain recent reforms in Arizona
discovery and impose changes that are not tailored to the conditions
presently existing in the state trial courts and require judges, lawyers and
litigants to find, comprehend and use another set of strictures. The
preferable approach at this juncture appears to be deferral of the decision to
prescribe or reject the new federal proposals as well as systematic
81. See supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text. See generally Paul V. Niemeyer, Here
We Go Again: Are The Federal Discovery Rules Really in Need of Amendment?, 39 B.C. L.
REV. 517 (1998); Subrin, Fishing, supra note 6, at 739-45.
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assessment of these requirements and of the discovery reforms that the
Arizona Supreme Court instituted during the 1990s. Once the court has
secured and consulted the maximum relevant information, it should be able
to determine more definitively whether the new federal amendments will
actually improve Arizona civil discovery.

